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Abstract
We establish a theoretical set−up that is able to endogenously integrate growth and longevity.
Our model captures three links between them: a longer life expectancy results in an increase
in savings as well as an increase in the workforce, but health and growth compete for
resources. We find that the key element is the response of longevity to an increase in health
resources. Our model suggests that the first two links could be the most important in poor
countries, which could explain their experience of simultaneous increases in growth and life
expectancy. The reverse result may apply for developed countries.
We are thankful to Charles Phelps for his helpful comments
Citation: Aísa, Rosa and Fernando Pueyo, (2004) "Endogenous longevity, health and economic growth: a slow growth for a
longer life?." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 3 pp. 1−10
Submitted: September 8, 2003.  Accepted: July 9, 2004.
URL: http://www.economicsbulletin.com/2004/volume9/EB−03I10002A.pdf1.- Introduction 
There is a general consensus that economic development goes hand in hand with 
important improvements in life expectancy. In fact, part of the literature on economic 
growth has recently directed its attention to analyzing the growth implications of an 
increment in longevity. Several elements relating longevity and growth have been 
considered in the theoretical literature. Some of them generate a positive relationship 
between both indicators, others a negative one. They can be grouped mainly into two 
sets of links. The first set is related to the quantity and quality of the labor force. The 
other examines the impact of declines in mortality on the saving rate.  
From the labor force point of view, people can provide effective labor services 
only if they are alive. As Van Zon and Muysken (2001) point out, to be alive and 
healthy is a necessary condition for the provision of human capital services that have 
been acquired from education. In fact, insofar as human capital is inherently tied to 
individuals, the expansion of life expectancy allows for returns to be obtained over a 
longer period of time, which encourages its accumulation and, as a consequence, 
economic growth (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2000; De la Croix and Licandro, 1999). In 
contrast, lengthening life also intensifies the competition for resources between the 
consumption and health needs of the elderly on the one hand, and investment in children 
on the other (Zhang et al., 2003). In this sense, an expansion of the health sector may 
promote growth through increased labor productivity, while a contraction of the health 
sector could also free the resources necessary to promote the accumulation of human 
capital (Van Zon and Muysken, 2001). However, the extension of the educational 
period delays incorporation into production, thereby causing a fall in the activity rate 
(De la Croix and Licandro, 1999).  
Longevity also has implications on the rate of physical capital accumulation. 
Longer life expectancies promote economic growth by affecting agents’ willingness to 
substitute consumption across time. Individuals with a higher life expectancy are more 
patient, generate higher levels of savings and, as a consequence, more growth (Reinhart, 
1999).  
In general, these studies have considered each of these links between longevity 
and economic growth separately. However, some of them have gone further by trying to 
detect which of the effects could be the most important and finding that development is 
a critical element in assessing this issue. In fact, the recent empirical evidence raises the 
possibility that the relation of economic growth to mortality is non-monotonic. Lee 
(1994) points out that less developed countries exhibit high mortality rates mostly in 
children and therefore a reduction in mortality increases the labor force, on one hand, 
and returns on investment, on the other. On the contrary, in developed countries, life 
expectancy exceeds the retirement age and so reducing mortality makes the population 
older but does not expand the labor force nor the returns on investment in formation. 
Kelley and Schmidt (1995) and Bhargava et al. (2001) find positive effects of declines 
in mortality on growth in low-income countries. For highly developed countries, the 
effect was negative. 
In this paper we investigate the connection between economic growth and life 
expectancy through an additional linkage, different to those previously mentioned: the 
competition for public resources. Our analysis endogenizes life expectancy by allowing 
the probability of survival to depend on the public expenditure on health care. It seems 
reasonable to assume that survival probability is increasing the average health level of 
society, which depends on the quantity of public resources used in the health sector. 
1 However, the provision of public health services competes with the resources for 
increasing public productive expenditure on infrastructures or services which influence 
long-run growth. In this sense, our paper is inspired by Drèze and Sen (1989), who 
distinguish two different experiences with success in the reduction of mortality which 
they call “growth mediated” and “support-led” processes. The first experience 
corresponds to countries in which fast economic growth generates the resources 
required to expand the social health status (South Korea or Hong Kong, for example). 
This is not the case of Sri Lanka or Costa Rica, countries with slow economic growth, 
in which the reduction of mortality is the consequence of the priority given to health 
care to the detriment of other uses of the resources. It seems, then, interesting to try to 
establish a theoretical set-up that is able to integrate growth, longevity and government 
spending on health care.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The equilibrium 
is described in section 3, in which we focus on the steady state. In Section 4 we discuss 
the effects of a reallocation of resources on both longevity and growth. Section 5 
summarizes the main results.  
2. The model 
  Population. Given that the goal of our analysis turns on the phenomenon of 
longevity, we assume that the number of births is constant at each moment in time. Let 
us assume that N individuals are born at time s, in such a way that they form cohort s. 
We consider, as in Blanchard (1985), an economy where individuals face an 
instantaneous probability p of dying at any moment. This probability is constant over 
the life of every cohort and depends on the social health status h in the birth period. The 
instantaneous probability of dying at any moment for a member of cohort s is p(hs), with 
p´<0. 
Let Xs denote the time until death of an individual of cohort s. Given hs, the 
assumption of a constant instantaneous probability of dying can be represented through 
a density function  . In such a context, the life 
expectancy of any individual of cohort s is given by 
. That is to say, a higher health status implies 
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Under these conditions, the population in t, that we call Lt, can be represented as:  
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Each individual is endowed with one unit of time per period, so that this is also 
the size of the workforce. Note that since at each moment in time the same number of 
individuals is born, the only source of population growth is the increase in life 
expectancy. 
  Consumers. Individuals’ welfare proceeds from the stream of consumption c 
over the period of living. Assuming that the instantaneous utility derived from 
consumption is logarithmic, the expected utility of a member of cohort s can be 
represented as: 
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2 where  cs,t is the goods consumption in t of an individual born in s and ρ  is the 
intertemporal discount rate of the utility. 
  Since the probability of being alive in any future period diminishes, individuals 
will then want to protect against the risk of dying without having spent their whole 
wealth through insurance. Therefore, we assume an insurance system in which 
competitive insurance firms receive the wealth of individuals in case they die in 
exchange for paying them a rate p on their wealth in each time over the whole period 
they are alive
1. This implies the following budget constraint: 
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where vs,t denotes the wealth owned by each member of cohort s at time t, rt is the 
interest rate and wt the wage rate. A dot over any variable indicates its variation in time: 
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  Production of final goods. Following Barro (1990), we assume that production 
of final goods Yt is the result of combining private capital Kt, labor Lt and productive 
public services GYt according to the following technology: 
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An amount Gt of final goods is procured by the government to provide productive 
as well as sanitary services. The rest is divided between aggregate consumption (Ct) and 
investment, in such a way that physical capital accumulation follows:  
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Physical capital is the only component of individuals wealth. 
Health. Social health status is the result of two opposite forces. On the one hand, 
biological processes involve a natural decay of health simply as time passes. We assume 
that this deterioration takes place at a constant rate δ. On the other hand, modern 
societies devote important amounts of resources to fighting against that natural 
deterioration. Health care expenditures are not able to prevent individuals’ death but 
delay the moment of death. We consider that health services Ght are publicly provided 
by the government.. Social health status accumulates depending on the expenditure on 
health as a percentage of income (Rivera and Currais, 1999). Therefore, social health 
status evolves over time according to: 
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  Government. Public revenues proceed from a tax rate τ on individuals’ income. 
Per capita expenditure is distributed between productive services for firms and health 
services. Let us denote the fractions of per capita expenditure devoted to each activity 
by   and 1- θ, respectively. Let us assume that public expenditure is financed 
contemporaneously by taxes. The government budget constraint is then given 
byG . From this expression, public expenditure on productive services and on 
health services is given by   and G , 
respectively. 
θ
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1 See Blanchard (1985). 
3 3. Equilibrium 
  Substituting the previous expression for the productive government services in 
the technology of production (4) and rearranging, we have: 
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In equilibrium, the net interest rate coincides with the net marginal productivity of 
capital. It is constant and given by: 
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Making use of these results, we can rewrite expressions (5) and (6) as: 








α θτ τ ) ( ) ( & ,   (9) 
   . (10)  t t h 1 h δ τ θ ξ− − = ) ( &
Steady State.  Since our interest is not the short-run but the long-run performance, 
we focus on what follows in the steady state. The long-run equilibrium of this economy 
is characterized by constant health status and life expectancy, which also implies a 
constant population. Moreover, output, consumption and capital grow at constant and 
identical rates.  
  From (10) we can deduce that the steady state health status is given by 
  
δ
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where the asterisk denotes the long-run value of any variable. Thus, from the 
corresponding constant probability of death   we can compute the steady 
state population as  . These results indicate that the 
society is healthier and individuals’ life longer, the higher the productivity of the health 
sector and the fraction of income devoted to it, and the lower the rate of biological 
deterioration. 
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 On the part of consumers, given a stable life expectancy, the evolution of 
aggregate consumption over time can be obtained as
2: 







L A 1 D *) ( ) (  stands for the (after tax) social productivity of capital; 
according to (8), the private productivity of capital is αD. On the other hand, if we 
denote by g the growth rate of both consumption and capital and by   the ratio 
of the two variables, equations (12) and (9) can be rewritten as 
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2 See again Blanchard (1985). 
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This system can be summed up in the following second-degree equation in g: 
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From the fact that Φ  and Φ  it follows that 
equation Φ has two positive roots, one lower than D and the other higher than D. The 
latter can be discarded because it implies a negative value of consumption in (14). 
Moreover, for the former to be positive, the condition Φ  
must hold. Thus, under the assumption that this condition holds, the long-run growth 
rate g* can be solved as the lower root of equation (15). 
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  Taking into account that our main goal is to investigate the connection between 
economic growth and life expectancy through the competition for public resources, we 
concentrate in what follows on the influence of the distribution of public expenditure 
both on the growth rate and on life expectancy.  
4. Health expenditure, growth and life expectancy 
Given the technology of the health sector ξ and the rate of biological deterioration 
δ, improvements in life expectancy can only be the result of a reallocation of resources 
in favor of health care. That is to say, a higher fraction of the GDP is devoted to health 
services. Given that we assume a completely public health system, we must consider the 
consequences of a reallocation of public expenditure towards health services. From (15) 
we have: 
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where   denotes the elasticity of the probability of dying with 
respect to social health status, which in the steady state coincides with the elasticity of 
life expectancy with respect to social health status. The sign of the above derivative 
depends crucially on the size of this elasticity. For an elasticity high enough, that is to 
say, when it exceeds the critical value ε , the derivative has a negative 
sign, which indicates that g and θ move in opposite directions. Thus, an increase in 
resources devoted to health (a reduction in θ) is accompanied by a faster long-run 
growth rate of output. Since it also implies a higher health status, in this case life 
expectancy and growth move in the same direction. 
dh dp p h h p / ) / ( , − = ε
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 On the contrary, when the elasticity is below ( , the sign of (16) is 
indeterminate and allows the possibility that life expectancy and growth react in 
opposite directions after the reallocation of resources, in such a way that an increase in 
the average life span takes place to the detriment of output growth. This possibility 
appears to be more likely the lower the elasticity.  
θ θ / ) − 1
  The reason for this outcome is that the growth rate is affected in several different 
ways by a reduction in θ. Since this implies a decrease in public expenditure in 
productive services for firms, a first effect is a reduction in final good firms productivity 
that reduces the growth rate of output. A second effect is related to the health status: 
more resources devoted to heath care mean a healthier population with a longer life on 
average. This in turn drives an enlargement of population and thus –given the reduced 
form of the technology in (7)- an increase in capital productivity. Therefore, there are 
5 two opposite effects on productivity due to a simultaneous reduction in public services 
and an enlargement of the workforce. Which of them dominates? For high values of the 
elasticity of life expectancy, this variable increases strongly and thus the effect of a 
higher workforce in productivity dominates. Otherwise, the effect of population is lower 
than the effect of the reduction of public productive services and productivity decreases.  
  In addition to this indeterminate effect through capital productivity, the growth 
rate is also affected by θ directly through the probability of dying, which is part of the 
effective discount rate of utility. The reduction in this probability increases the patience 
of consumers, who decide to consume less in favor of saving more. This, on one hand, 
will expand future consumption and, on the other, allow for a faster accumulation of 
physical capital. In turn, this enables a faster growth rate in the long run. Through this 
link, thus, growth and life expectancy are positively related. 
 The final effect is that ∂  when   and indeterminate 
otherwise. This implies that when ε , a reallocation of resources in favor 
of health services leads to a simultaneous increase in the growth rate and in life 
expectancy. In the reverse case, the possibility that life expectancy and growth are 
negatively related is also allowed. Both patterns can be observed in the experience of 
some countries, as described in the introduction.  
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  Developing countries are, in general, characterized by a high child mortality and 
thus a low life expectancy. However, it is relatively easy to provide conditions that 
improve individuals’ health and thus reduce early mortality. That is to say, a few more 
resources devoted to health can have relatively important consequences on life span. 
This corresponds to a high elasticity εp,h. Moreover, the fraction of the GDP devoted to 
health in these countries is below the average of developed countries. Both 
characteristics make it very probable that the condition ε  will hold. This 
can explain why the pattern followed in general in developing countries includes 
parallel increases in growth and life expectancy. 
p,h ≥ (1−θ)/θ
 On the contrary, developed countries exhibit longer life expectancy but, in 
contrast, experience great difficulties in obtaining a further increase in life span. This 
suggests that investment in health is progressively less effective in enlarging 
individuals’ life and thus the elasticity εp,h diminishes as life expectancy enlarges. 
Taking into account that health expenditure, as a fraction of income, is greater in 
developed countries, the conditions favor the relationship between the elasticity and the 
critical value (1 , holding in the opposite sense for the developing countries. As 
discussed earlier, for a value of elasticity low enough, the efforts devoted to enlarge life 
expectancy through a reallocation of resources to the health sector lead to a deceleration 
of the growth rate of the economy.  
−θ)/θ
From an empirical point of view, although there is evidence in favor of a non-
monotonic relationship between economic growth and longevity, there is no conclusive 
evidence on how public health expenditure influences life expectancy and economic 
growth depending on structural characteristics of the economy. Further research in this 
direction would be required. 
The above results can be reinforced by some additional effects that the model 
does not capture explicitly in order to maintain its tractability. The first one refers to the 
relationship between life expectancy and the age of retirement. With life expectancy 
exceeding the age at which individuals leave the labor market in developed countries, 
6 the positive effect of a longer life on productivity through the enlargement of the labor 
force does not appear (or, in general, has a very small importance). Thus, productivity, 
as well as the growth rate, is likely to be reduced. The opposite holds in developing 
countries in which individuals die while they are active and thus a longer life leads to a 
parallel expansion of labor supply.  
A second important feature that the model does not consider, but that would 
reinforce the asymmetry between developed and non-developed countries, is a more 
realistic distribution of the probability of death over life, one in which the probability of 
death increases with age. As Faruquee (2003) shows, introducing an age-specific 
mortality (instead of our cohort-specific mortality) makes the propensity to 
consumption increase over life, intensifying the role of young people in positive saving 
and the role of old people in negative saving. In such a context, whether better health 
reduces mortality mainly in old people or young people becomes a key element. Since, 
in developed countries, the mortality rate declines occur at older ages, when saving is 
negative, its effect on the saving rate, if any, would be very weak. However, in 
developing countries a better health status reduces mortality rates at much earlier stages 
of life and thus leads to strong positive effects on savings. Therefore, the actual pattern 
of mortality rates over life reinforces the positive relationship between life expectancy 
and growth in developing countries. 
Finally, other simplifying assumptions related to preferences also modify the 
relative importance of the savings link between longevity and growth. For example, it is 
well known that our assumption of a logarithmic utility implies a relative risk aversion 
of the unit, although the actual values seem to be higher. A higher risk aversion implies 
a higher propensity to consumption and, therefore, a lower saving rate. Thus, the higher 
the risk aversion, the weaker the positive link between longevity and growth. The 
importance of this link would also be lower when considering altruistic individuals that 
derive utility from leaving bequests to their heirs instead of our assumption about the 
insurance mechanism. Such a specification would be closer to an infinite horizon 
perspective (the individual derives utility not only from his own consumption but also 
from wealth passed to his heirs), and, therefore, the higher the degree of altruism, the 
lower the influence of life expectancy on saving decisions. Alternatively, the 
consideration of unintended bequests transferred to society when people die (Zhang et 
al., 2003) increase the capital available for production and thus introduces another link 
between longevity and economic growth: lengthening life reduces accidental bequests, 
thus reducing the rate of capital accumulation and growth. 
5. Conclusions 
Life expectancy, health, and economic growth are three important determinants of 
human welfare. In this paper we have analyzed the interrelationships between them, 
focusing on three kinds of links: those which affect saving decisions, those which take 
place through the labor market and, finally, the competition for resources between the 
different activities. Since these forces act in opposite directions, there is no clear result 
about whether longevity and growth are positively or negatively related in the long run. 
In order to shed more light on this issue, we have built a model in which average 
longevity is endogenously determined by public investment in health, while growth is 
driven by public expenditure in productive services that enhance private firms’ 
productivity. Despite the trade-off between longevity and growth determined by the 
allocation of resources between the two, a longer life expectancy leads to a higher 
7 savings rate and to an expansion of the workforce that could speed up growth. Indeed, 
which of these forces prevails depends on structural characteristics of the economy.  
 Thus, we have shown that the effectiveness of health expenditure in reducing 
mortality is a key element. If expanding the resources devoted to improve social health 
status has an important impact in terms of reducing mortality, the effects of higher 
savings and a bigger labor supply are the most important. As a consequence, the 
increase of longevity goes hand in hand with an acceleration of the long-run growth 
rate. This is the pattern corresponding to less developed countries, whose high mortality 
rates can be reduced easily by measures that do not, in general, require important 
amounts of resources. Conversely, longer life has become a hard and expensive task in 
developed countries, which makes it more likely that the efforts devoted to this purpose 
have a negative effect on long-run growth, a result that empirical analyses have pointed 
out recently.  
Although our framework is too simplistic in many aspects, the main results would 
prevail in more sophisticated specifications, as discussed above. Nevertheless, we think 
that some extensions like the introduction of a private health sector or the consideration 
of the links between longevity, investment in education and productivity could provide 
a deeper insight into the complex relationship between life expectancy and growth.  
 
Appendix: list of main variables and parameters 
A  Productivity index 
t s c ,   Consumption in t of an individual of cohort s 
C  Aggregate consumption  
D  Social productivity of capital 
g  Growth rate (of output, consumption and capital) 
G   Aggregate public expenditure  
Gh   Public expenditure on health services 
GY  Public expenditure on productive services 
hs  Health status of an individual of cohort s 
K  Physical capital 
L  Size of the population 
N  Number of individuals born at any time 
p  Probability of death 
r  Interest rate 
t s v ,   Wealth in t of an individual of cohort s 
w  Wage rate 
X  Time until death 
Y  Output 
α  Elasticity of output with respect to capital 
δ  Rate of biological deterioration 
h p, ε   Elasticity of longevity with respect to social health status 
θ  Fraction of public expenditure on productive services for firms 
ξ  Productivity of health sector 
ρ  Intertemporal discount rate 
τ  Tax rate 
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